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Abstract-The viewpoint espoused in this paper is that natural language understanding and production is the 
action of a number of highly integrated domain-specific specialists. Described first is an object oriented 
representation scheme which allows these specialists to be built. Discussed next is the organization of these 
specialists into a four-level goal hierarchy that enables the modelling of natural language conversation. It is 
shown how the representation and natural language structures can be used to facilitate the recall of earlier 
natural language conversations. Six specific kinds of recall tasks are outlined in terms of these structures and 
their occurrence in several legal dialogues is examined. Finally, the need for intelligent garbage collection of old 
episodic information is pointed out. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As with much current work on connected iscourse, the viewpoint of this research is that it is 
oversimplified to view natural language comprehension and production as the action of 
domain-independent and basically sequential syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic processes. It is 
instead more appropriate to build domain specific specialists which do whatever needs to be 
done (be it syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic) whenever it needs to be done. This is not to say 
there is no structure whatsoever on natural anguage processing. In fact, it is very useful to 
break down natural anguage processing into four levels according to the goals of the language 
user. At the top level are non-linguistic goals which call in scripts (like those in[l], for example) 
to direct any linguistic processing. Scripts call in speech act level goals (a linguistic construct 
first proposed by Austin [2]) to interpret or produce individual utterances, and these, in turn, can 
call in language level specialists that handle much of the traditional parsing and other 
“linguistic” activity. 
This domain-specific approach also leads to a basic concern for techniques to represent these 
specialisti in order to reduce the complexity of the task of putting together alarge knowledge base 
of them. An approach to representing knowledge is proposed which combines aspects of semantic 
network representation formalisms (surveyed in [31) and frame-based knowledge representation 
schemes (see [4]. [5] and many articles in [6]). As in many of these schemes, knowledge is 
represented in frame-like objects each of which can be considered as a node in an “extended” 
semantic network (extended in the sense that the relations are not necessarily binary). ISA and 
PART-OF hierarchies also exist and have the usual use in abstracting information. 
At this point the scheme proposed here begins to differ from frame or network represen- 
tation schemes. First, a context mechanism is proposed which not only allows dynamic 
focussing on relevent information to be achieved, but also forms the basis of an easily acquired 
“episodic memory”. Second, the basic frame-like objects have much more in the way of 
procedural capabilities than is usual. In particular they send messages to one another in order to 
achievesub-goalsorgleaninformation(muchasintheSMALLTALK[7]orACTOR[8]formalisms). 
If an object is not able to directly achieve some sub-goal or provide the required information, 
inheritance and other inferencing capabilities can be used as a consequence of the initial failure 
of this message passing. 
In order to display the usefulness of the representation scheme proposed here, a natural 
language application has been selected: the recall task. In this particular type of natural 
language understanding an individual is asked to remember conversations which occurred 
sometime in the past. Real life examples of this task are legion-earlier linguistic performance 
must be recalled in debates, on the witness stand, in reading tests, in lectures, and frequently 
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during ordinary conversation. This task turns out to be particularly well suited for the 
representation scheme, especially the scheme’s dynamic focussing and episodic memory 
capabilities. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the representation scheme is described. 
Next, a particular conversation (a conversation to buy a ticket to a concert) is modelled in 
terms of the representation scheme. In Section 4 various recall tasks are categorized and the 
representation scheme’s capabilities in handling these tasks are illustrated. Examples are given 
using recollections of the ticket buying conversation and using a number of legal dialogues. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn and open questions are discussed. 
2. THEREPRESENTIONSCHEME 
The primitive units of the representation scheme proposed here are frame-like (in the 
Minsky [5] sense) objects called pattertr expressions which can pass messages to each other and 
receive responses. All messages and responses are coordinated by an interpreter which reads 
messages from source objects, steers them to the proper target objects, and later directs the 
responses back to the appropriate source objects. 
The representation scheme is implemented as a set of programs collectively called ILISP 
(pronounced “bar-lisp”). System notation is based as closely as possible on LISP, and, in fact 
most of LISP can be invoked directly from /LISP. The version of ILISP described here has not 
been fully implemented, although it differs only slightly from previous versions which have. For 
a complete description of the representation scheme and its notation see [9]. 
Looking in more detail at the representation scheme, a pattern expression ()PEXPR) is an 
object whose structure (body) is a list of (possibly labelled) patterns. A pattern is a list whose 
first element is the name of a pattern expression, and the rest of whose elements are either the 
names of pattern expressions or are further sub-patterns. Messages to JPEXPRs are also 
patterns, handled by matching them against patterns in the IPEXPR and returning as response the 
first matching pattern. As in many AI programming languages (e.g. CONNIVER[lO]) the matching 
is complicated by the possible presence of single macro characters (“?“, “!“, “=“, “ J “, “I”) which 
may precede any element of either a message pattern or a JPEXPR pattern. These macros act as 
instructions to the matcher to perform special processing of various sorts when trying to achieve a 
match. As a knowledge base designer understands the domain being modelled, it is possible to 
gradually simplify or even eliminate many of these macros and achieve a smooth “procedural to 
declarative” evolution of the knowledge base. 
Here is a simple pattern expression: 
< IPDEF WIDGET-PEDDLER 
SI: (SUPERSET WIDGET-PEDDLER SELLER) 
S2: (SUPERSET WIDGET-PEDDLER PERSON) 
~3: (SELL JWIDGET-PEDDLER JWIDGET) 
~4: (TRADE JWIDGET-PEDDLER ABUYER ?GOODS 
!(COND ((SUB-INSTANCE-OF GOODS WIDGET) 
(CREATE-NEW ‘MONEY)) 
(T (CREATE-NEW ‘SERVICES)))) 
S5: (CORE WIDGET-PEDDLER (/S3 /S4)) 
S6: (INSTANCE WIDGET-PEDDLER PETER) 
S7: (INSTANCE WIDGET-PEDDLER MARTHA) > 
This is a simplified version of a knowledge base’s explicit knowledge about widget peddlers. 
It can be interpreted as follows: 
(i) the name of the 1PEXPR is WIDGET-PEDDLER; 
(ii) the body of the JPEXPR is the collection of patterns Sl-S7; 
(iii) each pattern in the body is designated with an (optional) label Si; 
(iv) patterns Sl and S2 define two supersets of WIDGET-PEDDLER, SELLER and 
PERSON; 
(v) pattern S3 says that an arbitrary instance of WIDGET-PEDDLER sells an arbitrary 
instance of WIDGETS (the “ J ” macro indicates that instances of the classes, not the classes 
themselves, are required); 
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(vi) pattern S4 says that an arbitrary instance of WIDGET-PEDDLER trades with an 
arbitrary instance of BUYER as follows: the widget peddler exchanges “goods” for either 
money or services depending on whether the goods are widgets or not (the “!” macro indicates 
that the form following the macro should be executed (/EVALed) not taken as is; the “?’ macro 
is explained below); 
(vii) pattern SS says that patterns S3 and S4 are the core patterns of the (PEXPR; i.e. they 
are more central to its meaning than are other patterns; 
(viii) patterns S6 and S7 “point to” a couple of instances of the widget peddler, PETER and 
MARTHA (PETER and MARTHA will have reverse INSTANCE-OF “pointers’‘-together 
with EX-INSTANCE-OF pointers described below, INSTANCE-OF and SUPERSET define a 
standard generalization hierarchy, or as it is now usually designated (see [ 111) an ISA hierurchy 
of pattern expressions). 
To see how WIDGET-PEDDLER might respond to a message sent to it, assume another 
pattern expression, say BUY-WIDGET, formulates the message (WIDGET-PEDDLER 
(TRADE PETER SELF SQUIGGLY-WIDGET ?COST)) Thus, BUY-WIDGET is interested in 
seeing what (according to WIDGET-PEDDLER) SELF might give to PETER in return for the 
SQUIGGLY-WIDGET. Here is a simplified outline of what happens to the message. 
The interpreter eads the message form and determines that the target pattern expression is 
WIDGET-PEDDLER. It thus creates a new, initially empty, pattern expression to serve as a 
working-storage area for WIDGET-PEDDLER as it answers the message. The new JPEXPR is 
given an internal name (WIDGET-PEDDLER-l, say) and is called an execution inskmce of 
WIDGET-PEDDLER. Next, three patterns are asserted in WIDGET-PEDDLER-l: 
(EX-INSTANCE-OF WIDGET-PEDDLER-l WIDGET-PEDDLER) 
(EX-ENVIRON WIDGET-PEDDLER-l BUY-WIDGET-l) 
(/STACK WIDGET-PEDDLER-l NIL) 
The EX-INSTANCE-OF pattern points to WIDGET-PEDDLER, the object which has been 
sent the message; via this pointer all of the ISA environemt can be accessed. The EX- 
ENVIRON pattern points to the execution instance of the sending (PEXPR (BUY-WIDGET-l, 
say) in the execution environment or dynamic context of WIDGET-PEDDLER-l. ISTACK 
indicates the local pattern expression stack, initially empty, that will contain any name/value 
bindings assigned uring processing within WIDGET-PEDDLER-l. Finally, the message pat- 
tern itself is recorded in WIDGET-PEDDLER-l for use when the interpreter decides to 
activate the IPEXPR. (WIDGET-PEDDLER-l is not immediately executed, but is instead 
scheduled for future execution. This allows, among other things, pseudo-parallelism and 
multiprocessing to be simulated and is similar to KRL’s[l2] use of an agenda.) 
When WIDGET-PEDDLER-l becomes the current pattern expression, the message pattern 
is retrieved and matched against target patterns in the body of WIDGET-PEDDLER. If a 
pattern that matches the message pattern is found, it is returned to BUY-WIDGET-l as the 
answer to the message. It is also asserted in the body of WIDGET-PEDDLER-l as sort of a 
declarative residue of procedural activity and can later be accessed if desired. 
In this example the pattern S4 is discovered and is found to match under the assumption 
that PETER is a particular WIDGET-PEDDLER (a fact discoverable by looking at the (PEXPR 
to see if it has a pattern 
(INSTANCE-OF PETER WIDGET-PEDDLER), 
and SELF is a particular BUYER. Assuming that SQUIGGLY-WIDGET is a particular 
WIDGET, the IEVALuation of the pattern’s last element will result in the creation of a new 
[PEXPR (called MONEYI) representing an individual price appropriate to the widget. Thus, 
the pattern to be returned in answer to the TRADE message is 
(TRADE PETER SELF SQUIGGLY-WIDGET MONEY 1). 
This pattern will be asserted in both WIDGET-PEDDLER-l and BUY-WIDGET-l. In addition 
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MONEY1 will be bound as the value of COST on the BUY-WIDGET-l stack (due to the “?” 
macro which says to bind a value on the stack of the execution instance containing the pattern 
with the macro). Such bindings may be useful to procedures executing in BUY-WIDGET-l. 
The question arises: what would have happened if no match had been discovered in 
WIDGET-PEDDLER? In cases such as this, the matcher does not give up. Instead, it looks at 
the first element of the pattern to be matched and seeks the aid of the pattern expression 
corresponding to that element (i.e. TRADE here). The rationale for consulting TRADE is that 
the first element of a pattern usually acts as the relation connecting all the other elements, and 
is thus the most crucial part of the pattern. The hope is that TRADE will have associated with it 
a failure to match pattern (such as, for example. 
(FAILURE-TO-MATCH TRADE ?PAT ?OBJ !(SEARCH-ISA PAT OBJ))) 
that tells the matcher what to do if at any time a pattern headed by TRADE is unmatched. The 
builder of the knowledge base can specify various possibilities: e.g. look into the ISA 
environment of WIDGET-PEDDLER-l, look into the execution environment of WIDGET- 
PEDDLER-l, perform an inference, return final failure, and so on. This puts into the hands of 
the designer the power to use local knowledge and context to determine what to do for a 
particular failure, although s/he must be very careful to take into account the subtleties 
involved in such inference, particularly inheritance (see[l3] for a thorough analysis of these 
subtleties). In any event this is one of the strong points of this representation scheme and 
contrasts with more uniform inferencing and procedural attachment mechanisms (e.g. KRL[12] 
or FRL [ 141). 
Once the message has been answered, the /PEXPR which sent the message (BUY- 
WIDGET-l, discovered by looking at the EX-ENVIRON pointer) is rescheduled. When it again 
becomes active, BUY-WIDGET-l can pick up the answer to the message and proceed with 
its computations. 
Of particular importance is the fact that WIDGET-PEDDLER-l has not disappeared. 
Execution instances are kept to maintain a record of the events taking place when they were 
executed, a crucial ability for the recall tasks discussed in Section 4. These execution instances 
not only still maintain their EX-ENVIRON and EX-INSTANCE-OF patterns, but they also still 
contain all other relevent patterns that were asserted during their execution. To retrieve 
knowledge in such an execution instance requires the sending of a message to the instance, with 
the consequent creation of an execution instance of an execution instance. The old execution 
instance has access to the old execution environment in which it was run; the newly created 
execution instance has access to the current execution environment. This gives a facility similar to 
that provided by the ALINK/CLINK distinction of [ 151 in that it allows information to be accessed 
in one context and returned to another. Moreover, it is possible in ILISP to have multiple levels of 
execution instances and hence to have the equivalent of many ALINKs. 
Eventually, of course, some sort of pruning or garbage collection of all this information 
must take place. Furthermore, given the potential importance of some execution instances, it 
seems crucial to do such garbage collection intelligently. This is further discussed in Section 6. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of how ILISP can be used in a natural anguage domain, 
some comment on its potential efficiency should be made. Since typically there are only 
relatively few patterns within a pattern expression, matching a pattern becomes computation- 
ally expensive only when failure-to-match inferences must be undertaken or when macro 
elements require further processing. Although in theory failure-to-match inferences can be 
arbitrary, in practice they usually involve non-explosive searches along converging and not very 
deep hierarchies. The presence of macro elements usually implies some sort of message passing 
is going on and this will be efficient if the knowledge in the system imposes trong constraints on 
the choice of target objects. Work on expert systems (e.g.[16]) seems to indicate that for many 
domains enough such knowledge can be accumulated. The big question is whether for a really 
large and diverse domain this is possible and in particular whether the sheer size and 
complexity of the task will be overwhelming. It is an article of faith of this and other frame 
theories that knowledge can be divided elegantly into large, nearly decomposable “chunks”[ 171 
and that these chunks (frames) can be incrementally added to a knowledge base without undue 
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complexity ever arising. The relatively small number of examples developed so far in the 
literature does not provide definitive evidence one way or the other of this contention, but the 
very existence of so much frame research activity seems to indicate a widespread optimism. 
3. USING ILISP IN A NATURAL LANGUAGE DOMAIN 
(LISP can be used to represent he various data and procedures necessary for appropriate 
natural language processing. To illustrate, assume the following typical task-oriented (in the 
sense of [18]) conversation occurs between a computer “model” and a ticket seller when the 
model “wants” to go to a symphony concert: 
Ticket-seller: “Yes?” 
Model: “I’d like a ticket to the concert.” 
Ticket-seller: “How about K-S? It is right centre about 10 rows back.” 
Model: “Fine. How much is that?” 
Ticket-seller: “10 dollars.” 
Model: “O.K. (pays the money) 
Ticket-seller: (produces the ticket) 
Model: “Thanks.” 
Ticket-seller: “Thank you sir.” 
First, much information about tickets, concerts, costs, ticket sellers, etc. must be represen- 
ted. This can be done rather straightforwardly by building appropriate pattern expressions and 
connecting them together using appropriate links. These pattern expressions will contain largely 
declarative patterns, e.g. 
< (PDEF LOWER-BALCONY-SEAT 
(SUPERSET LOWER-BALCONY-SEAT AUDITORIUM-SEAT) 
(COST J LOWER-BALCONY-SEAT J IO-DOLLARS) 
(VIEW JLOWER-BALCONY-SEAT EXCELLENT) 
(HEARING J LOWER-BALCONY-SEAT AVERAGE)> 
Note that the ticket seller (PEXPR will constitute a model of the conversant, a crucial need as 
Cohen[l9] and Allen[20] have discussed at length. 
But, these pattern expressions are secondary to the primary pattern expressions which 
actually carry out the goals of the model (both linguistic and non-linguistic). There are several 
major types of goals ranging from non-linguistic goals through scripts (akin to the scripts of [l] 
or [21]), and speech acts (computational nalogues of the speech acts of [2] and [22] and similar 
to those proposed in, for example, [19]) down to low level language goals. Non-linguistic goals 
tend to be “high level” goals which invoke scripts when a conversation is necessary to achieve 
the purposes of the high level goal. Scripts, in turn, direct a conversation, calling in speech act 
subgoals to understand or produce individual utterances of the conversants. Speech acts will 
usually (although not always) need to call on the expertise of still more specific language level 
goals to actually generate or interpret appropriate surface ianguage. 
For example, in the ticket buying situation, the non-linguistic goal of buying the ticket may 
necessitate the invocation of a script to direct a conversation with the ticket seller. This script 
will need to both understand particular speech acts (e.g. requests by the ticket seller for money, 
inquiries into types of tickets desired) and produce certain speech acts (e.g. to inform the ticket 
seller of the type of ticket desired). Finally, surface utterances uch as “Yes”, “How much is 
that?“, etc. will have to be handled at the language level. 
Of course. the strict top-down processing suggested here will not always work completely 
satisfactorily. Sometimes an invoked subgoal will fail, in which case the supergoal must explain 
what went wrong and invoke a more appropriate subgoal, perhaps trying to preserve partial 
results already provided in the failed subgoal’s execution instance. Recovery from error and 
making use of partial information are very hard problems as Minsky’s work [5] and much 
subsequent work on frames has pointed out, and, although McCalla[9] discusses these problems, 
this research provides no definitive solutions. 
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An alternative to top-down processing with error recovery is a judicious mixture of 
top-down and bottom-up processing. Bottom-up processes identify potentially relevent in- 
formation and top-down processes then pick and choose the most relevant such information to 
integrate into the evolving context. Again, an example in [9] is given where bottom-up rocessing 
of this ilk proves useful, but no general solutions are provided. The definitive research into this 
problem has been done by Havens [23] and many of his insights for the vision area would likely 
carry over to natural language processing. For the rest of this paper the problems of error 
recovery and bottom-up processing will be downplayed in order to allow a more extensive 
discussion of recall issues. 
Returning to the ticket buying example, it is important o realize that the various goals can 
be represented by pattern expressions, ones with more procedurally oriented patterns (i.e. 
patterns containing “!” and similar macros) than the secondary pattern expressions. For 
example, a simplified version of the script that directs a ticket buying conversation would look 
something like 
<IPDEF BUY-CONVERSATION 
SUPERSET BUY-CONVERSATION CONVERSATION) 
(EXECUTE BUY-CONVERSATION ?BUYER ?SELLER ?ITEM 
!(EVENT-SEQUENCE 
;start up conversation 
(WHAT-DO-YOU-WANT 
(EXECUTE WHAT-DO-YOU-WANT !SELLER !BUYER 
?WHAT-WANT-CONV)) 
;bargain over what buyer wants 
;first get bargaining positions 
;from conversant models 
(!BUYER (WANT !BUYER 
(EXCHANGE ?BUYER-HAS ?SELLER-WANTS))) 
(!SELLER (WANT !SELLER 
(EXCHANGE ?SELLER-HAS ?SELLER-WANTS))) 
;next enter into actual bargaining 
(BARGAIN 
(EXECUTE BARGAIN !SELLER !BUYER !SELLER-HAS 
!BUYER-WANTS !ITEM ?BARGAIN-I-CONV)) 
;bargain over what seller wants 
(BARGAIN 
(EXECUTE BARGAIN !BUYER !SELLER !BUYER-HAS 
!SELLER-WANTS !ITEM ?BARGAIN-ZCONV)) 
;exchange cost of item for item 
(EXCHANGE 
(EXECUTE EXCHANGE !BUYER !SELLER 
!(]POINTER COST ITEM) !ITEM ?CONV-EXCHANGE)) 
;close out the conversation 
(FAREWELL 
(EXECUTE FAREWELL !BUYER !SELLER ?BYE)),> 
The pattern expressions representing these goals invoke one another by passing messages, 
resulting in a dynamic subgoal hierarchy (the execution environment) containing non-linguistic 
goals at the top and low level language goals at the bottom. Any goal knows and can access 
knowledge in the goal which invoked it, and also in all supergoals. This is useful not only to 
avoid redundancy of information, but also to enable subgoals to execute in the context of their 
supergoals. Thus, the ticket-buying script (and all its subgoals) can know that the conversant is 
a ticket seller because this is knowledge “discovered” by the non-linguistic supergoal which 
wants the ticket to be bought. Just being able to diagnose the existence of a particular supergoal 
can be crucial in understanding such utterances as “Yes?“, “What are you doing here?“, etc. 
which are questions pecifically asking for the goals of a language user. 
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The subgoal hierarchy is the basic context feature of this approach to language. It provides a 
natural focussing mechanism by suggesting an ever narrower set of goals of interest to a 
particular situation. The goals in this “context” are not static and predetermined as is 
information in the context mechanism in, say, [24]; instead, goals are always changing as certain 
subgoals get accomplished (and hence become irrelevant) while others then become important. 
Moreover, these changes are nicely structured in terms of “level of detail”-lower goals change 
rapidly as minor changes occur in a situation; upper goals change more gradually (usually only 
after a succession of lower goals have been accomplished) as entire situations evolve into other 
situations. 
The subgoal hierarchy also acts as a starting point for searches of the knowledge base. The 
ISA hierarchy above a goal pattern expression can be accessed along SUPERSET, IN- 
STANCE-OF, or EX-INSTANCE-OF pointers. Similarly it is possible to access the PART-OF 
(or aggregation) hierarchy (see, e.g. [23]), as well as many “one-shot” pointers (forming no 
coherent organizational principle) to relevant information such as the current conversant, the 
kind of ticket currently wanted, the discovered location of a ticket outlet, etc. 
Since the execution instances in the subgoal hierarchy do not disappear, whole trees of old 
subgoal instantiations are available to provide “episodic” information (in the sense of [25]). At a 
given level of such an episodic tree are episodes which followed one another in sequence; going 
down a level gives a more detailed view of a particular sub-episode. This combination of both 
sequence information and subgoal information is different from the usual basically sequential 
view of episodic memory. Moreover, from each execution instance in this episodic memory the 
ISA hierarchy above the execution instance can be accessed so the episodic and semantic 
memories are perfectly compatible. 
4. THE RECALL TASK 
As mentioned in the introduction, a common kind of natural language understanding 
involves recalling earlier conversations. The /LISP representation scheme turns out to be very 
useful for handling this kind of natural anguage task. The major useful feature is the episodic 
capability mentioned at the end of the last section. 
There has been work on the recall task from the perspective of “story trees”[26,27] which 
are hierarchical, like execution instance trees, but not in terms of the goals of the language 
understander, rather in terms of the story structure itself. Kintsch and van Dijk[26] do 
suggest that the story trees are created as the text is being processed, which corresponds to the 
automatic creation of execution instance trees as a by-prcduct of the original linguistic 
processing. Wilensky[28] also structures tory memory hierarchically according to its “point” 
content (a! various levels of abstraction) rather than the language understander’s goals. 
For the purposes of illustration, assume the ticket-buying conversation of Section 3 has 
been recorded as in Fig. 1. (Note that the execution instances of many secondary pattern 
expressions invoked during the conversation have been trimmed by the intelligent garbage 
collector as have lower language level goals. More of this in Section 6.) 
Before the model can recall details of this conversation, the appropriate xecution instance 
goal hierarchy must be restored from memory. Although this paper doesn’t propose a complete 
solution to this problem, it appears from the court room recall dialogues discussed in Section 5 
that the recall request usually contains the information necessary in order for the hearer to 
associate to the episode in question. Things like dates, times, conversant names, places, etc. 
seem to work fairly well for people. It would be possible to structure a /LISP knowledge base 
with similar associative links in order to allow the appropriate retrieval. This has not been 
done-instead, the appropriate hierarchy is assumed to be readily available. 
Once the particular episode is retrieved from memory, many types of requests can be made. 
One such request is 
(la) “How much did the ticket seller claim the ticket cost?” 
To answer this request, the various execution instances in the hierarchy can be examined and 
the fact (stored in this case in INFORM-3) can be retrieved. This illustrates a fact retrieval 
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recall request, i.e. a task requiring access to a specific fact from a particular execution instance. 
There are many such examples: 
(lb) “Who sold the ticket?” 
(lc) “Where was the ticket located in the auditorium?” 
(Id) “How much was paid for the ticket?” 
In fact retrieval requests, the execution instance goal hierarchy often acts as a context 
mechanism in that it provides a starting point for memory searches for the required information 
rather than necessarily acting as the direct container of the information itself. Thus, if asked 
(le) “What were the various possible ticket prices?” 
the pattern expression containing information about the ticket actually bought could be 
retrieved from INFORM-l, but it wouldn’t contain the answer directly. Instead, inheritance 
from its superset (the pattern expression representing eneral ticket knowledge) of the various 
prices would be necessary. Thus, not only has the episodic memory constrained the search for 
the required ticket knowledge, but the failure-to-match processing that was useful in handling 
the original episode would also be useful in the recall domain. 
The biggest problem in handling fact retrieval recall is identifying the particular execution 
instance containing the fact. An associative activation style search (as discussed in [29], say) 
from various key concepts (e.g. TICKET, COST,. . .) mentioned in the recall sentence will 
fairly quickly intersect appropriate xecution instances from the episode under consideration 
and hence provide a small number of execution instances to search. Examining the structure of 
the script-level execution instances (or the corresponding eneric scripts themselves) may also 
prove useful in identifying likely steps which might contain the desired information. Finally, 
there is frequently an implicit structure to the recall dialogue that focusses attention on a 
particular execution instance in one utterance before requesting a fact from that instance in the 
next utterance. Such focussing is not only obvious in the legal dialogues that have been 
examined (see Section 5), but has also been the subject of much study recently (e.g. [30,31]). 
Another common kind of recall task is the motivation recall request where the various 
goals, desires, and motivations of the speakers are requested. For example, the following 
questions 
(2a) “Why did the ticket seller give the ticket to the ticket buyer?” 
(2b) “Why did the ticket buyer say “thanks’?” 
(2~) “What was the ticket buyer attempting to do in this episode?” 
all require implicit or explicit motivations to be retrieved. If the speaker who made the original 
utterances is later queried as to motivation it usually suffices to look at the pattern expressions 
in the goal hierarchy themselves to answer such a query. Thus, from the later perspective of 
the ticket buyer, query (2~) above can be answered by looking at the top level pattern 
expressions in the goal tree; i.e. the purpose of the ticket buyer is to ATTEND-CONCERT 
(discovered as the generic associated with the top level ATTEND-CONCERT-l pattern 
expression) or more specifically to BUY a ticket to the concert or yet more specifically to take 
part in a BUY-CONVERSATION to get a ticket to the concert. 
But if the motivation requested is not that of the model, then these goals must be inferred. 
This is a complicated task, as [201, [32], [33] and [34] and much other research as shown. From 
the structural point of view taken in this paper, however, the episodic tree at least provides a 
starting point. Patterns will have been left in the execution instances themselves recording the 
presumed goals or motivations of the other party. Thus, a pattern or patterns indicating that the 
purpose of the ticket seller is to sell tickets can be explicitly left in the BUY-CON- 
VERSATION-1 execution instance and later retrieved. If this hasn’t been done, failure-to- 
match processing can search the pattern expression representing the particular ticket seller 
(which is recorded in BUY-CONVERSATION-l) and its ISA parents for general motivations 
of ticket sellers. This kind of other party motivation request hus boils down to a special case of fact 
retrieval recalls. 
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Closely related to motivation recall requests are requests that ask for summaries of what 
happened, e.g. 
(3a) “What, overall, was she getting at when she said that?” 
(3b) “What was the conversation about?” 
(3~) “What were you trying to do?” 
These summary requests can be answered by looking at the execution instances in the upper 
levels of the goal hierarchy rather than at specific speech act or language level execution 
instances. The request can be an explicit one asking for a summary (as in (3b) where the 
BUY-CONVERSATION-l execution instance would be at the appropriate level of detail) or 
can be a relative request o go to a higher level of detail than the one currently being recalled 
(as in (3a) if it were issued after the person had been recounting a specific series of speech acts, 
say, and was being asked to move up to a script level). The ability to summarize, as 
Correira[27] suggests, is a very important attribute of any text understanding task. 
The opposite kind of request is one requiring the recaller to specify things to a lower level of 
detail as in 
(4b) “Exactly what did he say at this point?” 
(4b) “Be more specific.” 
(4~) “Recall the exact words that were used if you can.” 
Such specify requests will usually be issued after a definite level has been established from 
which to plunge downwards into more detail. Sometimes pecify requests can even require 
language level execution instances, as in (4c), although it seems reasonable to assume that most 
actual wordings will have been garbage collected. 
The fifth kind of recall task requires a specific sequence of events to be scanned. Examples 
of such event sequence recall requests include 
(5a) “Tell me what the ticket seller said next.” 
(5b) “Tell the court what happened after the ticket buyer and the ticket seller exchanged the 
money for the ticket.” 
(5~) “Recount in your own words the sequence of events leading up to the ticket buyer 
getting the ticket.” 
Answering these requests requires a horizontal scan at a particular level of detail rather than 
the vertical movements required in motivation, summary, or specify requests. Sometimes the 
focus is already established (as in 5a) and the next event is all that is required. Other times, the 
amount of specificity indicated in the recall request determines the level chosen. For example, 
the event referred to in (5b) above corresponds to the script level execution instance 
EXCHANGE-l. Thus, the next required event corresponds to the script level execution 
instance FAREWELL-l (i.e. the answer to (5b) would be something like “The two parties said 
farewell.“). 
In (5c), however, the event referred to is GIVE-2, a speech act (actually in this case a motor 
act!) The required events would thus be the immediately preceding speech act level events at 
least within the same sub-script. Of course, earlier events might be somewhat summarized (i.e. 
a possible answer could be something like “The seller and buyer greeted one another and 
bargained over cost and location of the ticket. The buyer than handed over $10 at which point 
he got the ticket.“). The episodic goal tree thus not only provides the basic event sequence, but 
also provides at least some structure as to the right level of response. Of course, specific 
heuristics must be worked out as to when to summarize and when not. 
The sixth type of request is a meta request in the sense that the structure of the goal 
hierarchy itself is being queried rather than its contents. Thus, 
(6a) “How long did you talk?” 
(6b) “Was the discussion uninterrupted?” 
(6~) “So you remember nothing after that?” 
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force an examination of the structure itself; i.e. to look, respectively, for length of con- 
versation, large numbers of non-linguistic execution instances in the tree, or the boundaries of 
the tree. 
No doubt there are many other types of recall possible besides these six (for example, since 
it is possible to have execution instances of execution instances, recalls of recall dialogues 
could be undertaken in order to answer queries like “What did you do after you told her how I 
had been buying a ticket?“). The important point is that the structure of episodic memory 
provides a basis for categorizing the various kinds of recall requests and for answering them in 
an appropriate way. This provides for the recall domain a similar insight to the use in[ 181 of 
task structure to determine focus in task oriented dialogues. 
KSOMELEGALEXAMPLES 
In this section five stereotypical legal dialogues (taken from the series of volumes American 
Jurisprudence Proof of Facts[35]) are examined for evidence of both hierarchically structured 
episodes and the various types of recall requests. In each of these dialogues a witness is being 
queried by a lawyer about some conversation he or she had in the past with (usually) a defendent 
who is being sued. Each dialogue starts with the lawyer evoking in the mind of the witness the 
conversation to be recalled by specifying dates, times, etc. 
Once this has been accomplished, etails of the conversation are elicited by specify requests 
such as “What exactly was said?” Then, frequently, the lawyer issues a series of event 
sequence requests such as “What was said next?” to force the witness to march through the 
previous conversation. Information as to what was said is usually provided at the speech act 
level, but occasionally the witness is asked to abstract a summary at an obviously higher level 
(“Was there a discussion between you and the defendent about this asking price?“) or the 
witness crawls up and down levels summarizing and specifying. Fact retrieval requests 
frequently occur (“How much of a down payment did the defendent want?“) Sometimes 
something like ISA inheritance seems to have taken place to retrieve a fact (as in the italicized 
parts of “. . . to finance a mortgage on $40,000, the amount of the purchase price minus the down 
payment.. . “) There are several occasions where meta responses are given by the witness (“I 
thought to myself for a couple of minutes. . .“, “. . . a few minutes later. . .“, “I don’t recall 
anything else”) although such responses are not directly requested. There is even an occasion 
where exact wording is requested (i.e. language level goals). There are no motivation requests, 
probably because they are inappropriate in a legal setting. 
It seems clear from the examples that the methodology proposed here is quite useful. 
However, this usefulness will rapidly diminish in any realistic setting unless the many episodic 
memory structures can be intelligently garbage collected. 
BINTELLIGENTGARBAGECOLLECTION 
It is crucial to wisely clean up the incredible amount of information that accumulates during 
natural anguage processing. This is the function of the intelligent garbage collection routines. 
First and foremost, these routines must delete many of the execution instances which have 
been accumulated. In most of the legal dialogues, only speech act level paraphrases of prior 
discussions are given. This suggests that a useful heuristic is to delete all execution instances at 
or below the language level. Of course, this doesn’t always work. In certain situations (e.g. very 
embarrassing situations, important discussions, the occurrence of a shocking event such as an 
assassination, etc.) execution instances might stay around in much more detail. In any event if 
this deletion by level is done poorly, later recollections will be overgeneralized. 
As well as removing execution instances by taking a horizontal cut at the hierarchy, many 
must also be pruned by chopping vertically. During any processing many secondary pattern 
expressions will be contacted, many irrelevant pattern expressions will be tried and rejected, 
and many low-level “housekeeping” duties will need to be undertaken. The execution instances 
associated with these can be removed. Of course, too much pruning of this sort would result in 
a selective memory where certain steps are forgotten. A useful heuristic here is to keep only 
execution instances of scripts and speech acts and not keep execution instances of the 
conversant models and the like since they aren’t major plan steps. 
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In task oriented dialogues with lots of packaged scripts already in existence, the examinable 
nature of the scripts allows perusal of the script itself to get most of the required information 
during a recall. All that needs to be kept for each script is a skeletal execution instance. Messages 
can still be sent to the execution instance as before; failure to match processing would 
automatically initiate inheritance from the script level without the rest of the knowledge base 
needing to know the execution instance is a mere skeleton. Of course, certain data such as 
speakers, locales, etc. which change each time the script is invoked, also need to be kept, but 
these data would be relatively fewer in number. 
In non-task-oriented dialogues execution instances take on added importance and hence 
shouldn’t be as readily removed. Here, the script level must be abstracted somehow “on the 
fly” since specific preordained scripts will not be available. Some of these higher level pattern 
expressions will arise as plans created by general purpose conversation scripts to handle 
specific situations as they arise in conversation. Such planning takes place frequently as [l], 
[19], [36] and other research has shown. Since a plan is not as permanent nor as tested as a 
script, it seems appropriate to keep the execution instances around to record how the plan 
actually worked out. Moreover, there would usually be in absolute number more execution 
instances in a planned conversation than in a scripted one as various interpretation and genera- 
tion strategies were tried, further enhancing the likelihood of at least some execution instances 
surviving. Evidence for this can be seen in Bartlett’s[4] experimental results that subjects 
recalled things they had found difficult to understand (i.e. things that in ILISP would require 
more processing to comprehend, and hence more execution instances) more readily than easy 
to understand things. 
Another role for execution instances (especially in non-task-oriented dialogues) is to act as 
origins for the ISA generalization of information from low level sequences of speech acts. Such 
generalization (by the intelligent garbage collector) may be a way (other than planning) of 
creating script level pattern expressions. Both plans and the generalized pattern expressions 
may eventually become scripts as use proves their worth. 
The intelligent garbage collector also needs to integrate newly acquired episodes into the 
overall knowledge base. Many links are already there since an episode’s execution instances 
are laden with patterns that connect the episode to other pattern expressions. But the legal 
dialogues of Section 5 illustrate that these must be better organized and new ones added. The 
legal dialogues start off with a number of facts (e.g. “Do you know the price which the 
defendent, Mr. Smith, was asking for the property on Oak Street at the time you noticed it was 
for sale?“) which obviously uniquely pinpoint he episode in memory. During the dialogues, the 
witnesses often are able to skip through several different episodes which all relate to the same 
topic even if they happened at widely different times (“[then] the agent came back to my 
service station about two weeks later. . .” ). The witnesses eem to be able to organize their 
memories around certain topic designations, maybe not at first, but certainly later when 
rehearsing for a courtroom appearance. Somehow, the intelligent garbage collector will have to 
do this kind of topic organization and will have to add the various links into the episode from 
other relevent pattern expressions. Perhaps Reichman’s work [37] on topic delineated context 
spaces may be useful here. 
Such “learning” capabilities are an interesting aspects of the intelligent garbage collector’s 
duties and need to be explored in much more detail. At least in /LISP the raw materials for 
appropriate learning are provided in the form of the execution instances themselves and the 
various hierarchies to which they are attached. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The most important lesson to be drawn from this research is the value of taking an 
integrated view of the whole linguistic endeavour. This broad view has led to a recognition of 
the versatility of many of the language and representation features. Thus, pattern expressions 
can represent both static and dynamic information. They have aspects of both frame and 
network approaches. Execution instances are needed purely from a computational point of 
view, but also turn out to be helpful both during conversation and during recall. The execution 
environment is a useful context mechanism; it also forms the basis for episodic memory. The 
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goal hierarchy is important for handling the original conversation and also is crucial in allowing 
recall at varying levels of detail. 
The most interesting single feature of this approach is the use of execution instances in 
recalling earlier behaviour. Making the execution instances pattern expressions has allowed 
them to be useful later. It means that episodic memory is built up automatically as a by-product 
of message passing behaviour. It also means that the structure of episodic memory closely 
parallels the original structure of the episode being modelled and isn’t something artificially 
reconstructed later. This structure allows the delineation, in structural terms, of several 
different types of recall (fact retrieval, motivation, summary, specify, event sequence and meta) 
and a couple of types of memory failure (overgeneralization a d selective memory). 
There are a host of open computational issues regarding how to access an episode, how to 
best peruse it under different circumstances, etc. There are also many unresolved linguistic and 
representation subtleties. But, the most interesting and crucial task is to discover a lot more 
about the intelligent garbage collection process. To paraphrase Schank and Abelson[38]- 
forgetting promises to be a major endeavour in computational linguistics research. 
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